★
Executive Orders Historical Archive
Cite
Executive Order 12635 ⚖️⚠️ Zone 3: Lowest Ebb Constitutional Friction / Overreach (-0.19) 📜 Art. I §8: Legislative Prerogative Tension (Purse & Commerce)

Executive Order 12635—Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Panama

•
Friday, April 8, 1988
•
4 min read (782 words)

Executive Brief • At a Glance

⏱️ 4 min read (782 words) • ● In Effect
🎯 Primary Mandate

Except to the extent provided in regulations which may hereafter be issued pursuant to this Order: (a) Any direct or indirect payments or transfers from the United States to the Noriega/Solis regime of funds, including currency, cash or coins of any nation, or of other financial or investment assets or credits are prohibited.

⚖️ Constitutional Footing
⚖️⚠️ Zone 3: Lowest Ebb
Incompatible with Expressed Will of Congress or High Friction
📜 Art. I §8: Legislative Prerogative Tension (Purse & Commerce)
🏛️ Scope & Affected Sectors
Sovereign State Governments & Localities Executive Departments & Federal Civil Servants Private Citizens & Property Owners Foreign Nations & International Entities

Plain-English Translation & Framers' Constitutional Analysis

Early Statesman synthesis distilling legal jargon into practical meaning, statutory anchors, and structural constitutional impacts.

Signed by President Ronald Reagan on April 8, 1988, this order concerns Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Panama. Blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Panama that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of persons located within the United States.

Constitutional Assessment: An early statesman would subject this decree to rigorous scrutiny under Article I, Section 8. The Framers deliberately committed commerce, taxation, tariffs, and revenue to Congress alone. To the extent this order imposes duties or financial burdens without explicit statutory pre-authorization, it creates friction with the separation of powers.

Key Directives & Operative Actions

▪

Except to the extent provided in regulations which may hereafter be issued pursuant to this Order: (a) Any direct or indirect payments or transfers from the United States to the Noriega/Solis regime of funds, including currency, cash or coins of any nation, or of other financial or investment assets or credits are prohibited.

▪

All transfers, or payments owed, to the Government of Panama shall be made into an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be held for the benefit of the Panamanian people.

▪

For purposes of this Order, the term "Noriega/ Solis regime" shall mean Manuel Antonio Noriega, Manuel Solis Palma, and any agencies, instrumentalities or entities purporting to act on their behalf or under their asserted authority.

▪

Any direct or indirect payments or transfers to the Noriega/Solis regime of funds, including currency, cash or coins of any nation, or of other financial or investment assets or credits, by any United States person located in the territory of Panama, or by any person organized under the laws of Panama and owned or controlled by a United States person, are prohibited.

Constitutional & Societal Entities Impacted

🏛️ Sovereign State Governments & Localities 🏛️ Executive Departments & Federal Civil Servants 🏛️ Private Citizens & Property Owners 🏛️ Foreign Nations & International Entities 🏛️ Financial Institutions & Monetary Authorities

Policy Areas & Topics

🏛️

The Framers' Constitutional Council

1787 Prism

Evaluating this order against the constitutional debates of 1787 and the limits of Article II executive power.

⚖️⚠️ Zone 3 (Lowest Ebb)
§

"When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb."

— Justice Robert H. Jackson, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) Incompatible with Expressed Will of Congress or High Friction
JM

James Madison

Separation of Powers & Legislative Primacy

"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." — Federalist No. 47 (1788)

Madison would express grave alarm over this order. By asserting independent authority in tension with legislative limits or the Bill of Rights, the Executive risks collapsing the separation of powers into unilateral rule. Under the Madisonian model, no emergency justifies the Executive substituting its decree for a deliberative Act of Congress.

Madisonian Stance: Strict Dissent (Overreach)
AH

Alexander Hamilton

The Energetic Executive & Unified Command

"The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength must be under the direction of the single hand of the Executive." — Federalist No. 74 (1788)

Hamilton would forcefully champion executive discretion here. For foreign entanglements, commerce defense, and national security, deliberative assemblies are too slow and faction-ridden. A unified, energetic Executive exercising swift command is precisely what the Philadelphia Convention intended for national preservation.

Hamiltonian Stance: Qualified Caution
GM

George Mason

Bill of Rights, Due Process & 10th Amendment

"The purse and the sword ought never to be in the same hands... nor the liberties of the citizen placed at the pleasure of a single magistrate." — Virginia Ratifying Convention (1788)

George Mason and the Anti-Federalists would sound a fierce warning. They feared that Article II would inevitably evolve into an elective monarchy. When an executive order impacts private rights, property, or civil liberties without individualized judicial process, Mason would see their darkest predictions verified.

Anti-Federalist Stance: Vehement Objection
📐

Five Measurable "Constitutional Friction" Dimensions

An objective audit measuring potential separation-of-powers tension against the United States Constitution and established Supreme Court doctrine.

⚠️ Elevated Constitutional Friction
79 / 100 friction index
Dimension 1 • Art. I, §1 & §8

Legislative Encroachment & Purse

High Friction

Touches upon core congressional prerogatives: raises appropriations reallocation, tariff imposition, or statutory preemption questions.

Benchmark: Power of the purse, taxes/tariffs, and rule of law reserved to Congress.
Dimension 2 • Art. II, §1 & §3

Executive Scope & Faithfulness

High Friction

Invokes broad unilateral or emergency executive authorities that test the constitutional boundary of the Take Care Clause.

Benchmark: Faithfully execute laws enacted by Congress vs. unilateral decree.
Dimension 3 • 10th Amendment

Federalism & State Sovereignty

Moderate Friction

Engages state and local partners in cooperative federalism programs.

Benchmark: Police powers and un-delegated responsibilities reserved to the States.
Dimension 4 • 5th & 14th Amendments

Due Process & Individual Rights

High Friction

Scrutinized under the Bill of Rights for potential impact on private contracts, property rights, or procedural due process.

Benchmark: Protection of private property, contracts, liberty, and procedural justice.
Dimension 5 • Separation of Powers

Youngstown Jacksonian Tier

High Friction

The order asserts independent Article II prerogative against statutory constraints, reallocates funds without explicit appropriation, or stretches executive power into realms constitutionally reserved to the legislature or judiciary.

Benchmark: Incompatible with Expressed Will of Congress or High Friction
⚖️ Audit Synthesis

This directive engages significant constitutional friction across statutory authorization, legislative prerogatives, or individual liberties.

Weighted composite: Art. I (25%), Art. II (25%), Federalism (15%), Due Process (15%), Youngstown (20%).
ℹ️
How to read these dimensions: Executive power expands whenever an administration acts without explicit statutory authorization from Congress (Article I), touches upon police powers historically reserved to the states (Tenth Amendment), or limits private rights and property without judicial process. A low friction score indicates strict concordance with enacted law; a high friction score highlights orders testing the limits of presidential discretion.
Total Words
782
4,747 characters
Estimated Read Time
4 min
@ 200 words / min
Flesch-Kincaid
17.5
Post-Graduate Legal
Language Tone Score
-0.19
Constitutional Friction / Overreach
How is this scored?
Text size:

Official Archival Text

View Source Document
📑Sections Outline (7 sections)

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, find that the policies and actions in Panama of Manuel Antonio Noriega and Manuel Soils Palma constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

Section 1. #sec-1

I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Panama that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of persons located within the United States. For purposes of this Order, the Government of Panama is defined to include its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities, including the Banco Nacional de Panama and the Caja de Ahorros.

Sec. 2. #sec-2

Except to the extent provided in regulations which may hereafter be issued pursuant to this Order: (a) Any direct or indirect payments or transfers from the United States to the Noriega/Solis regime of funds, including currency, cash or coins of any nation, or of other financial or investment assets or credits are prohibited. All transfers, or payments owed, to the Government of Panama shall be made into an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be held for the benefit of the Panamanian people. For purposes of this Order, the term "Noriega/ Solis regime" shall mean Manuel Antonio Noriega, Manuel Solis Palma, and any agencies, instrumentalities or entities purporting to act on their behalf or under their asserted authority. (b) Any direct or indirect payments or transfers to the Noriega/Solis regime of funds, including currency, cash or coins of any nation, or of other financial or investment assets or credits, by any United States person located in the territory of Panama, or by any person organized under the laws of Panama and owned or controlled by a United States person, are prohibited. All transfers, or payments owed, to the Government of Panama by such persons shall be made into an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to the held for the benefit of the Panamanian people. For purposes of Section 2(b), "United States person" is defined to mean any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, juridical person organized under the laws of the United States, or any person in the United States.

Sec. 3. #sec-3

Sections 1 and 2 shall not be deemed to block property or interests in property of the Government of Panama, including, but not limited to, accounts established at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as described in section 2, with respect to which transactions are authorized by, or on behalf of, the recognized representative of the Government of Panama as certified by the Secretary of State, or are otherwise authorized in regulations which may hereafter be issued pursuant to this Order. Section 2 shall not be deemed to prohibit interbank clearing payments.

Sec. 4. #sec-4

The measures taken pursuant to this Order are intended to extend the effectiveness of actions initiated in cooperation with the Government of Panama and its President, Eric Arturo Delvalle, and are not intended to block private Panamanian assets subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or to prohibit remittances by United States persons to Panamanian persons other than the Noriega/Solis regime.

Sec. 5. #sec-5

This Order shall take effect at 4:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time on April 8, 1988, except as otherwise provided in regulations issued pursuant to this Order.

Sec. 6. #sec-6

The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers or agencies of the Federal Government.

Sec. 7. #sec-7

Nothing contained in this Order shall confer any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization, enforceable against the United States, its agencies or its officers, or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or its officers. This Order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register. RONALD REAGAN The White House, April 8, 1988. [Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 12:04 p.m., April 11, 1988]

🔗

Referenced By Later Executive Orders (1)

Subsequent presidents who cited, amended, continued, or revoked this directive in later orders.

📜

Scholarly & Legal Citations

Exec. Order No. 12,635 (Apr. 8, 1988), https://executiveordersarchive.org/orders/app-executive-order-12635-prohibiting-certain-transactions-with-respect-panama.