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Executive Order 14294 🏛️✅ Zone 1: Maximum Authority Constitutional Fidelity (+0.58) 📜 Art. II §2: Commander-in-Chief Supervisory Authority

Fighting Overcriminalization in Federal Regulations

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Friday, May 9, 2025
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7 min read (1,481 words)
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90 Fed. Reg. 20363

Executive Brief • At a Glance

⏱️ 7 min read (1,481 words) • ● In Effect
🎯 Primary Mandate

Prosecution of criminal regulatory offenses is most appropriate for persons who know or can be presumed to know what is prohibited or required by the regulation and willingly choose not to comply, thereby causing or risking substantial public harm.

⚖️ Constitutional Footing
🏛️✅ Zone 1: Maximum Authority
Express or Implied Congressional Authorization
📜 Art. II §2: Commander-in-Chief Supervisory Authority
🏛️ Scope & Affected Sectors
Armed Forces & Military Establishments Sovereign State Governments & Localities Executive Departments & Federal Civil Servants Private Citizens & Property Owners

Plain-English Translation & Framers' Constitutional Analysis

Early Statesman synthesis distilling legal jargon into practical meaning, statutory anchors, and structural constitutional impacts.

Signed by President Donald Trump on May 9, 2025, this order concerns Fighting Overcriminalization in Federal Regulations. The United States is drastically overregulated. The Code of Federal Regulations contains over 48,000 sections, stretching over 175,000 pages—far more than any citizen can possibly read, let alone fully understand. Worse, many carry potential criminal penalties for violations.

Constitutional Assessment: Scrutinized through Article II, Section 2, this action exercises the President's constitutional role as Commander in Chief. Early Framers recognized broad executive discretion in commanding military forces during conflict, provided it remains bounded by congressional declarations and respects civilian domestic courts.

Key Directives & Operative Actions

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Policy

Prosecution of criminal regulatory offenses is most appropriate for persons who know or can be presumed to know what is prohibited or required by the regulation and willingly choose not to comply, thereby causing or risking substantial public harm.

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Report on Criminal Regulatory Offenses

Within 365 days of the date of this order, the head of each agency, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall provide to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a report containing: (i) a list of all criminal regulatory offenses enforceable by the agency or the Department of Justice; and (ii) for each criminal regulatory offense identified in subsection (a)(i) of this section, the range of potential criminal penalties for a violation and the applicable mens rea standard for the criminal regulatory offense.

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Promoting Regulatory Transparency

Following issuance of this order, all future notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) and final rules published in the Federal Register , the violation of which may constitute criminal regulatory offenses, should include a statement identifying that the rule or proposed rule is a criminal regulatory offense and the authorizing statute.

▪
Default Mens Rea for Criminal Regulatory Offenses

The head of each agency, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall examine the agency's statutory authorities and determine whether there is authority to adopt a background mens rea standard for criminal regulatory offenses that applies unless a specific regulation states an alternative mens rea.

Constitutional & Societal Entities Impacted

🏛️ Armed Forces & Military Establishments 🏛️ Sovereign State Governments & Localities 🏛️ Executive Departments & Federal Civil Servants 🏛️ Private Citizens & Property Owners
🏛️

The Framers' Constitutional Council

1787 Prism

Evaluating this order against the constitutional debates of 1787 and the limits of Article II executive power.

🏛️✅ Zone 1 (Maximum Authority)
§

"When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate."

— Justice Robert H. Jackson, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) Express or Implied Congressional Authorization
JM

James Madison

Separation of Powers & Legislative Primacy

"The constitutional magistracy was designed not to invent policy, but to be the faithful instrument of the laws passed by the people's representatives." — Speech in the First Congress (1789)

Madison would approve the structural posture of this order. The President acts strictly in subordination to statutory authority granted under Article II, Section 3 ("take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"). The checks and balances hold firm because the policy origin remains with the legislature.

Madisonian Stance: Concurring (Statutory)
AH

Alexander Hamilton

The Energetic Executive & Unified Command

"The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength must be under the direction of the single hand of the Executive." — Federalist No. 74 (1788)

Hamilton would forcefully champion executive discretion here. For foreign entanglements, commerce defense, and national security, deliberative assemblies are too slow and faction-ridden. A unified, energetic Executive exercising swift command is precisely what the Philadelphia Convention intended for national preservation.

Hamiltonian Stance: Strong Prerogative Support
GM

George Mason

Bill of Rights, Due Process & 10th Amendment

"The president will be surrounded by flatterers and sycophants... and the great powers of the executive will gradually absorb the liberties of the people." — Cato IV (Anti-Federalist, 1787)

The Anti-Federalist prism advises continuous democratic vigilance. Even routine administrative directives aggregate centralized federal power away from town halls and state assemblies toward a distant executive apparatus.

Anti-Federalist Stance: Eternal Vigilance Required
📐

Five Measurable "Constitutional Friction" Dimensions

An objective audit measuring potential separation-of-powers tension against the United States Constitution and established Supreme Court doctrine.

⚖️ Discretionary Twilight Zone
46 / 100 friction index
Dimension 1 • Art. I, §1 & §8

Legislative Encroachment & Purse

Moderate Friction

Administers commerce or fiscal programs requiring ongoing statutory delegation and legislative oversight.

Benchmark: Power of the purse, taxes/tariffs, and rule of law reserved to Congress.
Dimension 2 • Art. II, §1 & §3

Executive Scope & Faithfulness

Moderate Friction

Directs internal executive branch machinery, agency workflows, and federal personnel.

Benchmark: Faithfully execute laws enacted by Congress vs. unilateral decree.
Dimension 3 • 10th Amendment

Federalism & State Sovereignty

High Friction

Creates friction with the Tenth Amendment by conditioning state grants, mandating local compliance, or preempting state police powers.

Benchmark: Police powers and un-delegated responsibilities reserved to the States.
Dimension 4 • 5th & 14th Amendments

Due Process & Individual Rights

Moderate Friction

Applies regulatory or compliance standards to private contractors or commercial entities.

Benchmark: Protection of private property, contracts, liberty, and procedural justice.
Dimension 5 • Separation of Powers

Youngstown Jacksonian Tier

Low Friction

The President operates strictly as the constitutional Chief Executive, carrying out policy established by Congress with strong statutory backing.

Benchmark: Express or Implied Congressional Authorization
⚖️ Audit Synthesis

This order operates within Justice Jackson’s Zone of Twilight, resting upon concurrent presidential authority or congressional silence.

Weighted composite: Art. I (25%), Art. II (25%), Federalism (15%), Due Process (15%), Youngstown (20%).
ℹ️
How to read these dimensions: Executive power expands whenever an administration acts without explicit statutory authorization from Congress (Article I), touches upon police powers historically reserved to the states (Tenth Amendment), or limits private rights and property without judicial process. A low friction score indicates strict concordance with enacted law; a high friction score highlights orders testing the limits of presidential discretion.
Total Words
1,481
9,454 characters
Estimated Read Time
7 min
@ 200 words / min
Flesch-Kincaid
17.7
Post-Graduate Legal
Language Tone Score
+0.58
Constitutional Fidelity
How is this scored?
Text size:

Official Archival Text

View Source Document
FR Page 20363

Executive Order 14294 of May 9, 2025 Fighting Overcriminalization in Federal Regulations By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1 . #sec-1

Purpose . The United States is drastically overregulated. The Code of Federal Regulations contains over 48,000 sections, stretching over 175,000 pages—far more than any citizen can possibly read, let alone fully understand. Worse, many carry potential criminal penalties for violations. The situation has become so dire that no one—likely including those charged with enforcing our criminal laws at the Department of Justice—knows how many separate criminal offenses are contained in the Code of Federal Regulations, with at least one source estimating hundreds of thousands of such crimes. Many of these regulatory crimes are “strict liability” offenses, meaning that citizens need not have a guilty mental state to be convicted of a crime. This status quo is absurd and unjust. It allows the executive branch to write the law, in addition to executing it. That situation can lend itself to abuse and weaponization by providing Government officials tools to target unwitting individuals. It privileges large corporations, which can afford to hire expensive legal teams to navigate complex regulatory schemes and fence out new market entrants, over average Americans. The purpose of this order is to ease the regulatory burden on everyday Americans and ensure no American is transformed into a criminal for violating a regulation they have no reason to know exists.

Sec. 2 . #sec-2

Policy . It is the policy of the United States that: (a) Criminal enforcement of criminal regulatory offenses is disfavored. (b) Prosecution of criminal regulatory offenses is most appropriate for persons who know or can be presumed to know what is prohibited or required by the regulation and willingly choose not to comply, thereby causing or risking substantial public harm. Prosecutions of criminal regulatory offenses should focus on matters where a putative defendant is alleged to have known his conduct was unlawful. (c) Strict liability offenses are “generally disfavored.” United States v. United States Gypsum, Co. , 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978). Where enforcement is appropriate, agencies should consider civil rather than criminal enforcement of strict liability regulatory offenses or, if appropriate and consistent with due process and the right to jury trial, see Jarkesy v. Securities and Exchange Commission , 603 U.S. 109 (2024), administrative enforcement. (d) Agencies promulgating regulations potentially subject to criminal enforcement should explicitly describe the conduct subject to criminal enforcement, the authorizing statutes, and the mens rea standard applicable to those offenses.

Sec. 3 . #sec-3

Definitions . For purposes of this order: (a) “Agency” has the meaning given to “Executive agency” in section 105 of title 5, United States Code ; (b) “Criminal regulatory offense” means a Federal regulation that is enforceable by a criminal penalty; and (c) “Mens rea” means the state of mind that by law must be proven to convict a particular defendant of a particular crime.

FR Page 20364

Sec. 4 . #sec-4

Report on Criminal Regulatory Offenses . (a) Within 365 days of the date of this order, the head of each agency, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall provide to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a report containing: (i) a list of all criminal regulatory offenses enforceable by the agency or the Department of Justice; and (ii) for each criminal regulatory offense identified in subsection (a)(i) of this section, the range of potential criminal penalties for a violation and the applicable mens rea standard for the criminal regulatory offense. (b) At the same time the head of each agency provides to the Director of OMB the report required by subsection (a) of this section, the agency head shall publicly post the report on its agency webpage. (c) The head of each agency shall periodically, but not less than once a year, update the report described in subsection (a) of this section. (d) Criminal enforcement of any criminal regulatory offense not identified in the report described in subsection (a) of this section is strongly discouraged. The head of each agency shall consider whether a criminal regulatory offense is included in an agency's public report when considering whether to make a criminal referral to the Department of Justice or, where applicable, to the agency's Inspector General. Further, the Attorney General shall consider whether a criminal regulatory offense is included in an agency's public report before initiating an investigation or initiating criminal proceedings for violating regulatory standards.

Sec. 5 . #sec-5

Promoting Regulatory Transparency . (a) Following issuance of this order, all future notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) and final rules published in the Federal Register , the violation of which may constitute criminal regulatory offenses, should include a statement identifying that the rule or proposed rule is a criminal regulatory offense and the authorizing statute. Agencies should draft this statement in consultation with the Department of Justice. (b) The regulatory text of all NPRMs and final rules with criminal consequences published in the Federal Register after the date of this order should explicitly state a mens rea requirement for each element of a criminal regulatory offense, accompanied by citations to the relevant provisions of the authorizing statute. (c) Strict liability criminal regulatory offenses are disfavored. Any proposed or final criminal regulatory offense that includes a strict liability mens rea for the offense shall be treated as a “significant regulatory action” and submitted to the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for the review applicable to significant regulatory actions under Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993 (Regulatory Planning and Review), or any successor process.

Sec. 6 . #sec-6

Default Mens Rea for Criminal Regulatory Offenses . (a) The head of each agency, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall examine the agency's statutory authorities and determine whether there is authority to adopt a background mens rea standard for criminal regulatory offenses that applies unless a specific regulation states an alternative mens rea. (b) Within 30 days of the submission of the report described in section 4(a) of this order, the head of each agency, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall submit a report to the Director of OMB summarizing the information submitted under section 4(a) of this order and assessing whether the applicable mens rea standards for criminal regulatory offenses enforced by the agency are appropriate. If consistent with the statutory authorities identified pursuant to the review described in subsection (a) of this section, the report should present a plan for changing the applicable mens rea standards and adopting a generally applicable background mens rea standard, and provide a justification for each criminal regulatory offense for which the agency proposes to deviate from its default mens rea standard.

Sec. 7 . #sec-7

Agency Referrals for Potential Criminal Enforcement . Within 45 days of the date of this order, and in consultation with the Attorney General,

FR Page 20365

each agency should publish guidance in the Federal Register describing its plan to address criminally liable regulatory offenses. Each agency's guidance should make clear that when the agency is deciding whether to refer alleged violations of criminal regulatory offenses to the Department of Justice, the agency should consider factors such as: (a) the harm or risk of harm, pecuniary or otherwise, caused by the alleged offense; (b) the potential gain to the putative defendant that could result from the offense; (c) whether the putative defendant held specialized knowledge, expertise, or was licensed in an industry related to the rule or regulation at issue; and (d) evidence, if any is available, of the putative defendant's general awareness of the unlawfulness of his conduct as well as his knowledge or lack thereof of the regulation at issue.

Sec. 8 . #sec-8

Effect on Immigration Enforcement and National Security Functions . Nothing in this order shall apply to the enforcement of the immigration laws or regulations promulgated to implement such laws, nor shall it apply to the enforcement of laws or regulations related to national security or defense.

Sec. 9 . #sec-9

General Provisions . (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. (c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

THE WHITE HOUSE, #signature

May 9, 2025.

🏛️Official NARA Filing:FR Doc. 2025-08681 Filed 5-13-25; 8:45 am
Billing Codes: 3395-F4-P
📜

Scholarly & Legal Citations

Exec. Order No. 14,294, 90 Fed. Reg. 20,363 (May 9, 2025).